Development of an ontology supporting failure analysis of surface safety valves used in Oil & Gas applications

Treball desenvolupat dins el marc del programa 'European Project Semester'.The project describes how to apply Root Cause Analysis (RCA) in the form of a Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on hydraulically actuated Surface Safety Valves (SSVs) of Xmas trees in oil and gas applications, in order to be able to predict the occurrence of failures and implement preventive measures such as Condition and Performance Monitoring (CPM) to improve the life-span of a valve and decrease maintenance downtime. In the oil and gas industry, valves account for 52% of failures in the system. If these failures happen unexpectedly it can cause a lot of problems. Downtime of the oil well quickly becomes an expensive problem, unscheduled maintenance takes a lot of extra time and the lead-time for replacement parts can be up to 6 months. This is why being able to predict these failures beforehand is something that can bring a lot of benefits to a company. To determine the best course of action to take in order to be able to predict failures, a FMECA report is created. This is an analysis where all possible failures of all components are catalogued and given a Risk Priority Number (RPN), which has three variables: severity, detectability and occurrence. Each of these is given a rating between 0 and 10 and then the variables are multiplied with each other, resulting in the RPN. The components with an RPN above an acceptable risk level are then further investigated to see how to be able to detect them beforehand and how to mitigate the risk that they pose. Applying FMECA to the SSV mean breaking the system down into its components and determining the function, dependency and possible failures. To this end, the SSV is broken up into three sub-systems: the valve, the actuator and the hydraulic system. The hydraulic system is the sub-system of the SSV responsible for containing, transporting and pressurizing of the hydraulic fluid and in turn, the actuator. It also contains all the safety features, such as pressure pilots, and a trip system in case a problem is detected in the oil line. The actuator is, as the name implies, the sub-system which opens and closes the valve. It is made up of a number of parts such as a cylinder, a piston and a spring. These parts are interconnected in a number of ways to allow the actuator to successfully perform its function. The valve is the actual part of the system which interacts with the oil line by opening and closing. Like the actuator, this sub-system is broken down into a number of parts which work together to perform its function. After breaking down and defining each subsystem on a functional level, a model was created using a functional block diagram. Each component also allows for the defining of dependencies and interactions between the different components and a failure diagram for each component. This model integrates the three sub-systems back into one, creating a complete picture of the entire system which can then be used to determine the effects of different failures in components to the rest of the system. With this model completed we created a comprehensive FMECA report and test the different possible CPM solutions to mitigate the largest risks

Variation in Structure and Process of Care in Traumatic Brain Injury: Provider Profiles of European Neurotrauma Centers Participating in the CENTER-TBI Study.

INTRODUCTION: The strength of evidence underpinning care and treatment recommendations in traumatic brain injury (TBI) is low. Comparative effectiveness research (CER) has been proposed as a framework to provide evidence for optimal care for TBI patients. The first step in CER is to map the existing variation. The aim of current study is to quantify variation in general structural and process characteristics among centers participating in the Collaborative European NeuroTrauma Effectiveness Research in Traumatic Brain Injury (CENTER-TBI) study. METHODS: We designed a set of 11 provider profiling questionnaires with 321 questions about various aspects of TBI care, chosen based on literature and expert opinion. After pilot testing, questionnaires were disseminated to 71 centers from 20 countries participating in the CENTER-TBI study. Reliability of questionnaires was estimated by calculating a concordance rate among 5% duplicate questions. RESULTS: All 71 centers completed the questionnaires. Median concordance rate among duplicate questions was 0.85. The majority of centers were academic hospitals (n = 65, 92%), designated as a level I trauma center (n = 48, 68%) and situated in an urban location (n = 70, 99%). The availability of facilities for neuro-trauma care varied across centers; e.g. 40 (57%) had a dedicated neuro-intensive care unit (ICU), 36 (51%) had an in-hospital rehabilitation unit and the organization of the ICU was closed in 64% (n = 45) of the centers. In addition, we found wide variation in processes of care, such as the ICU admission policy and intracranial pressure monitoring policy among centers. CONCLUSION: Even among high-volume, specialized neurotrauma centers there is substantial variation in structures and processes of TBI care. This variation provides an opportunity to study effectiveness of specific aspects of TBI care and to identify best practices with CER approaches

Variation in general supportive and preventive intensive care management of traumatic brain injury: a survey in 66 neurotrauma centers participating in the Collaborative European NeuroTrauma Effectiveness Research in Traumatic Brain Injury (CENTER-TBI) study

Abstract Background General supportive and preventive measures in the intensive care management of traumatic brain injury (TBI) aim to prevent or limit secondary brain injury and optimize recovery. The aim of this survey was to assess and quantify variation in perceptions on intensive care unit (ICU) management of patients with TBI in European neurotrauma centers. Methods We performed a survey as part of the Collaborative European NeuroTrauma Effectiveness Research in Traumatic Brain Injury (CENTER-TBI) study. We analyzed 23 questions focused on: 1) circulatory and respiratory management; 2) fever control; 3) use of corticosteroids; 4) nutrition and glucose management; and 5) seizure prophylaxis and treatment. Results The survey was completed predominantly by intensivists (n = 33, 50%) and neurosurgeons (n = 23, 35%) from 66 centers (97% response rate). The most common cerebral perfusion pressure (CPP) target was > 60 mmHg (n = 39, 60%) and/or an individualized target (n = 25, 38%). To support CPP, crystalloid fluid loading (n = 60, 91%) was generally preferred over albumin (n = 15, 23%), and vasopressors (n = 63, 96%) over inotropes (n = 29, 44%). The most commonly reported target of partial pressure of carbon dioxide in arterial blood (PaCO2) was 36–40 mmHg (4.8–5.3 kPa) in case of controlled intracranial pressure (ICP) < 20 mmHg (n = 45, 69%) and PaCO2 target of 30–35 mmHg (4–4.7 kPa) in case of raised ICP (n = 40, 62%). Almost all respondents indicated to generally treat fever (n = 65, 98%) with paracetamol (n = 61, 92%) and/or external cooling (n = 49, 74%). Conventional glucose management (n = 43, 66%) was preferred over tight glycemic control (n = 18, 28%). More than half of the respondents indicated to aim for full caloric replacement within 7 days (n = 43, 66%) using enteral nutrition (n = 60, 92%). Indications for and duration of seizure prophylaxis varied, and levetiracetam was mostly reported as the agent of choice for both seizure prophylaxis (n = 32, 49%) and treatment (n = 40, 61%). Conclusions Practice preferences vary substantially regarding general supportive and preventive measures in TBI patients at ICUs of European neurotrauma centers. These results provide an opportunity for future comparative effectiveness research, since a more evidence-based uniformity in good practices in general ICU management could have a major impact on TBI outcome

Development of an ontology supporting failure analysis of surface safety valves used in Oil & Gas applications

Treball desenvolupat dins el marc del programa 'European Project Semester'.The project describes how to apply Root Cause Analysis (RCA) in the form of a Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on hydraulically actuated Surface Safety Valves (SSVs) of Xmas trees in oil and gas applications, in order to be able to predict the occurrence of failures and implement preventive measures such as Condition and Performance Monitoring (CPM) to improve the life-span of a valve and decrease maintenance downtime. In the oil and gas industry, valves account for 52% of failures in the system. If these failures happen unexpectedly it can cause a lot of problems. Downtime of the oil well quickly becomes an expensive problem, unscheduled maintenance takes a lot of extra time and the lead-time for replacement parts can be up to 6 months. This is why being able to predict these failures beforehand is something that can bring a lot of benefits to a company. To determine the best course of action to take in order to be able to predict failures, a FMECA report is created. This is an analysis where all possible failures of all components are catalogued and given a Risk Priority Number (RPN), which has three variables: severity, detectability and occurrence. Each of these is given a rating between 0 and 10 and then the variables are multiplied with each other, resulting in the RPN. The components with an RPN above an acceptable risk level are then further investigated to see how to be able to detect them beforehand and how to mitigate the risk that they pose. Applying FMECA to the SSV mean breaking the system down into its components and determining the function, dependency and possible failures. To this end, the SSV is broken up into three sub-systems: the valve, the actuator and the hydraulic system. The hydraulic system is the sub-system of the SSV responsible for containing, transporting and pressurizing of the hydraulic fluid and in turn, the actuator. It also contains all the safety features, such as pressure pilots, and a trip system in case a problem is detected in the oil line. The actuator is, as the name implies, the sub-system which opens and closes the valve. It is made up of a number of parts such as a cylinder, a piston and a spring. These parts are interconnected in a number of ways to allow the actuator to successfully perform its function. The valve is the actual part of the system which interacts with the oil line by opening and closing. Like the actuator, this sub-system is broken down into a number of parts which work together to perform its function. After breaking down and defining each subsystem on a functional level, a model was created using a functional block diagram. Each component also allows for the defining of dependencies and interactions between the different components and a failure diagram for each component. This model integrates the three sub-systems back into one, creating a complete picture of the entire system which can then be used to determine the effects of different failures in components to the rest of the system. With this model completed we created a comprehensive FMECA report and test the different possible CPM solutions to mitigate the largest risks

Development of an ontology supporting failure analysis of surface safety valves used in Oil & Gas applications

Treball desenvolupat dins el marc del programa 'European Project Semester'.The project describes how to apply Root Cause Analysis (RCA) in the form of a Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on hydraulically actuated Surface Safety Valves (SSVs) of Xmas trees in oil and gas applications, in order to be able to predict the occurrence of failures and implement preventive measures such as Condition and Performance Monitoring (CPM) to improve the life-span of a valve and decrease maintenance downtime. In the oil and gas industry, valves account for 52% of failures in the system. If these failures happen unexpectedly it can cause a lot of problems. Downtime of the oil well quickly becomes an expensive problem, unscheduled maintenance takes a lot of extra time and the lead-time for replacement parts can be up to 6 months. This is why being able to predict these failures beforehand is something that can bring a lot of benefits to a company. To determine the best course of action to take in order to be able to predict failures, a FMECA report is created. This is an analysis where all possible failures of all components are catalogued and given a Risk Priority Number (RPN), which has three variables: severity, detectability and occurrence. Each of these is given a rating between 0 and 10 and then the variables are multiplied with each other, resulting in the RPN. The components with an RPN above an acceptable risk level are then further investigated to see how to be able to detect them beforehand and how to mitigate the risk that they pose. Applying FMECA to the SSV mean breaking the system down into its components and determining the function, dependency and possible failures. To this end, the SSV is broken up into three sub-systems: the valve, the actuator and the hydraulic system. The hydraulic system is the sub-system of the SSV responsible for containing, transporting and pressurizing of the hydraulic fluid and in turn, the actuator. It also contains all the safety features, such as pressure pilots, and a trip system in case a problem is detected in the oil line. The actuator is, as the name implies, the sub-system which opens and closes the valve. It is made up of a number of parts such as a cylinder, a piston and a spring. These parts are interconnected in a number of ways to allow the actuator to successfully perform its function. The valve is the actual part of the system which interacts with the oil line by opening and closing. Like the actuator, this sub-system is broken down into a number of parts which work together to perform its function. After breaking down and defining each subsystem on a functional level, a model was created using a functional block diagram. Each component also allows for the defining of dependencies and interactions between the different components and a failure diagram for each component. This model integrates the three sub-systems back into one, creating a complete picture of the entire system which can then be used to determine the effects of different failures in components to the rest of the system. With this model completed we created a comprehensive FMECA report and test the different possible CPM solutions to mitigate the largest risks

Influenzaseizoen 2016/2017 in Nederland: langdurige epidemie voornamelijk veroorzaakt door influenza A(H3N2)-virussen

The influenza epidemic of the 2016/2017 season in the Netherlands lasted for 15 weeks and was dominated by influenza A viruses of the H3N2 subtype, predominantly of clade 3C.2a1. In addition, influenza B viruses were detected, predominantly of the lineage B/Yamagata/ 16/88, which displayed antigenic drift compared to viruses that circulated in the previous influenza season. Influenza B viruses of the B/Victoria/2/87-lineage were detected sporadically. Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were also sporadically detected that were antigenically indistinguishable from the viruses that have cir cu la ted since 2009